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Abstract 
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use 
laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. 
Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by 
the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as 
the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the 
laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including 
dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional 
contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a 
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Costly competitions between economic agents are often modeled as contests. Examples 
range from litigation and lobbying, to wars and violent global conflicts (Tullock, 1964; Krueger, 
1974). The variety of economic, management and political situations that can be described as 
contests has attracted enormous attention from economic theorists (Konrad, 2009; Vojnovic, 
2016). The three canonical models of contests include the Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking, 
the Lazear and Rosen (1981) rank-order tournament, and the all-pay auction (Hirshleifer and 
Riley, 1978; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Although the underlying assumptions of these models 
vary, all models assume that (i) contestants expend costly efforts while competing for a prize and 
(ii) an individual contestant’s probability of winning the prize depends on the contestants’ 
relative efforts and abilities. 
Although there is sizable empirical literature examining behavior in contests 
(Prendergast, 1999; Szymanski, 2003; Connelly et al., 2014), such studies address only a limited 
set of questions. This is understandable, given the nature of field data. First of all, there is a 
problem of measurement error, since the researcher can only observe the performance of 
contestants, which is a function of effort, ability and luck (Ericsson and Charness, 1994). In 
addition, there is a problem of self-selection and endogeneity (Kimbrough et al., 2018). To 
circumvent these issues, researchers often use controlled laboratory experiments to study 
behavior in contests (see the review by Dechenaux et al., 2015).  
Controlled experiments allow researchers to test theoretical predictions about contests 
while minimizing measurement error, and the implications of self-selection and unobservable 
characteristics. Moreover, most experiments allow direct measurement of individual effort, while 
controlling for the relative abilities of individuals, as well as relevant parameters of interest (such 
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as the number of players, the number of prizes, and the length of the contest). This article 
provides a short review of this research. 
 
2. Canonical Models of Contests 
Using the structure of Dechenaux et al. (2015), assume there are 𝑛𝑛 risk-neutral players 
competing for a prize value 𝑣𝑣. Each player 𝑖𝑖 expends an effort 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and bears a cost of effort 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖). 
The performance of player 𝑖𝑖, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, depends on player 𝑖𝑖’s effort 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and a random variable 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
independently drawn from some common distribution with cumulative distribution function 𝐹𝐹: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.         (1) 
The probability that player 𝑖𝑖 wins the prize depends on player 𝑖𝑖’s performance 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 and the 
performance of all other 𝑛𝑛 − 1 players, and it is defined by the following contest success 
function: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦−𝑖𝑖) = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1  if ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 > 0 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦−𝑖𝑖) = 1𝑛𝑛 otherwise.   (2) 
Here, 𝑟𝑟 ≥ 0 is a sensitivity parameter. The expected payoff for player 𝑖𝑖 is equal to the probability 
of winning the prize 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦−𝑖𝑖) times the prize value 𝑣𝑣 minus the cost of effort 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖): 
𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦−𝑖𝑖)𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖).       (3) 
A simple version of a Tullock contest can be obtained by setting 𝑎𝑎 = 0 in (1), 𝑟𝑟 ∈ (0,∞) 
in (2), and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in (3). To obtain an all-pay auction, we set 𝑎𝑎 = 0 in (1), 𝑟𝑟 = ∞ in (2), and 
𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in (3). Finally, to obtain a rank-order tournament of Lazear and Rosen (1981), we set 
𝑎𝑎 = 1 in (1), 𝑟𝑟 = ∞ in (2), and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) = 𝑐𝑐(𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) in (3), where 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 > 0 and 𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 > 0. The exact Nash 




3. General Experimental Findings on Contests 
3.1. Overbidding 
One of the most common findings in experimental literature on contests, first discovered 
by Millner and Pratt (1989), is overbidding – participants in laboratory experiments expend 
efforts which are substantially higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. This 
phenomenon, also known as over-dissipation or over-expenditure, is especially well-documented 
in lottery contests, i.e., contests in which the sensitivity parameter in (2) is restricted to 𝑟𝑟 = 1. 
Sheremeta (2013) examines a sample of 30 lottery contest experiments and finds that the average 
effort is 72% higher than predicted by theory. In some cases, the extent of overbidding is so high 
that participants, on average, receive negative payoffs (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and 
Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Mago et al., 2016). Figure 1 displays a distribution of efforts commonly 
observed in contest experiments. The data are taken from Sheremeta (2017). Almost 80% of 
participants expend higher than predicted effort. 
Figure 1: Distribution of effort in a contest experiment.
 
Source: Sheremeta (2017). 
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Different theories have been offered to explain overbidding in contests (Sheremeta, 2013, 
2015). The first explanation is that, in addition to monetary incentives, participants derive a non-
monetary utility from winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Cason et al., 
2012, 2017). To demonstrate this, Sheremeta (2010) designed a simple method of eliciting the 
utility of winning – individuals participate in a contest with a monetary prize and then in a 
contest with no prize. The results of the experiment show that individuals who expend effort just 
to be recognized as winners also expend higher effort in a contest with a monetary prize. 
The second explanation is that participants are prone to mistakes. These mistakes add 
noise to the Nash equilibrium solution, exacerbating overbidding in contests (Sheremeta, 2011; 
Chowdhury et al., 2014; Lim et al., 2014). Another explanation is that, rather than maximizing 
their absolute payoff, participants care about their relative payoffs (Fonseca, 2009; Mago et al., 
2016). Finally, recently Sheremeta (2017) showed that impulsivity, measured through a 
Cognitive Reflection Test, may be one of the most important factors explaining overbidding in 
contests. 
 
3.2. Comparative Static Predictions 
Despite significant overbidding, most comparative static predictions of contest theory are 
supported in the laboratory. 
One of the well-established theoretical and empirical results is the “incentive effect”: the 
total effort increases in the size of the prize. One of the first experimental studies to establish the 
incentive effect in contests is by Bull et al. (1987). The authors show that the total effort in the 
rank-order tournament increases as prize increases. Similar results are obtained by Morgan et al. 
(2012) and Sheremeta (2011) in the context of lottery contests. 
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An important comparative static prediction is the “size effect”: the total effort is 
increasing (non-decreasing) in the number of contestants. Some of the studies that have shown 
this are by Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), Sheremeta (2011), Morgan et al. (2012), and Lim et 
al. (2014). It is important to emphasize that, although the total effort is increasing in the number 
of contestants, per capita effort may actually decrease. 
When the contest is between asymmetric players, a well-known theoretical result is the 
“discouragement effect”: weaker players strategically cut back effort when facing a stronger 
player, and as a result, total effort decreases in the degree of asymmetry between players. The 
discouragement effect has been well supported by experimental research of lottery contests 
(Fonseca, 2009; Anderson and Freeborn, 2010; Kimbrough et al., 2014), all-pay auctions (Davis 
and Reilly, 1998; Llorente-Saguer et al., 2016), rank-order tournaments (Weigelt et al., 1989; 
Schotter and Weigelt, 1992), and other contests (Cason et al., 2010; Gill and Prowse, 2012). 
Another well-known comparative static result is that effort decreases in the variance of 
noise, i.e., the variance of a random variable 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 in equation (1). The intuition is that when the 
probability of winning depends more on noise than on effort, then there is little incentive to 
expend effort. This intuition has been shown to hold true in rank-order tournaments (Bull et al., 
1987; Cason et al., 2018) and Tullock-type contests (Potters et al., 1998; Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Mago et al., 2013). 
 
4. Other Contests 
4.1. Dynamic Contests 
Many contests have a dynamic structure, with one player making a move after observing 
the move of the other player. In such sequential contests, the first-mover often has an advantage 
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over the follower. Although some experimental studies find evidence for the first-mover 
advantage (Shogren and Baik, 1992; Fonseca, 2009; Gill and Prowse, 2012), others do not 
(Weimann et al., 2000; Vogt et al., 2002). This is because, instead of best responding and 
maximizing their expected payoff, second-movers often seek to equalize the probability of 
winning across players (Vogt et al., 2002). 
Perhaps the most popular dynamic contest is the multi-stage race (also known as the best-
of-n contest). In such a contest, a player needs to win a certain number of battles (contests) in 
order to win the entire contest. One of the first experimental studies of races was done by Zizzo 
(2002), who found a positive correlation between effort in a given battle and progress in the race. 
Follow-up studies by Ryvkin (2011), Deck and Sheremeta (2012), and Mago et al. (2013) have 
examined the questions of fatigue, preemption and “strategic momentum” in the context of races. 
Other types of dynamic contests, called the “war of attrition” and the “tug-of-war”, also 
have been studied in the laboratory. The war of attrition – a dynamic contest in which players try 
to outlast each other – has been studied by Hörisch and Kirchkamp’s (2010), DeScioli and 
Wilson (2011), and Oprea et al. (2013). The tug-of-war – a dynamic contest in which a player 
wins the war if the difference in the number of battle victories exceeds some threshold – has 
been studied by Deck and Sheremeta (2017). 
Generally, these studies find support for the comparative static predictions of the theory. 
For example, experimental studies of dynamic contests find that effort increases in the prize 
value and the size of intermediate rewards (Mago et al., 2013; Gelder and Kovenock, 2017), and 
that it decreases in the magnitude of “strategic momentum,” i.e., how far one player is ahead of 
the other (Mago et al 2013; Mago and Sheremeta, 2018). Also, as predicted, asymmetric contests 
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tend to be resolved in favor of the contestant with the advantage (DeScioli and Wilson, 2011; 
Oprea et al., 2013). 
 
4.2. Multi-dimensional Contests 
Many competitions resemble games of multi- dimensional contests. Perhaps one of the 
most famous is the Colonel Blotto game, in which two players simultaneously compete in 
several contests and the winning player is the player who wins the most contests. Two of the 
earlier experimental studies examining behavior in the Colonel Blotto game were done by 
Avrahami and Kareev (2009) and Chowdhury et al. (2013). Both studies find support for the 
qualitative predictions of the theory. In particular, the weaker player (with lower budget) uses a 
“guerilla warfare” strategy that stochastically allocates zero effort to a subset of contests, while 
the stronger players use a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, expending positive effort in 
each contest. 
In additional to studying the classical constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, experimental 
studies have examined non-constant-sum multi-dimensional contests in the context of all-pay 
auctions (Arad and Rubinstein, 2012; Holt et al., 2016; Montero et al., 2016; Mago and 
Sheremeta, 2017; Kovenock et al., 2018) and lottery contests (Deck et al., 2017; Kovenock et al., 
2018; Mago and Sheremeta, 2018). Although, generally, these studies find support for the 
comparative static predictions, many studies find one notable deviation from the theory. 
Specifically, contrary to the theory, participants often choose to focus on the “minimal winning 




4.3. Group Contests 
Group contests are prevalent in the field. One interesting feature of group contests is that 
they can create two competing incentives: First, in order to succeed, members of the same group 
have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending effort. However, since effort is costly, 
each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free-ride on 
the efforts of other group members. Contest theory predicts that the intensity of competition 
between groups and the amount of free-riding within groups depends on the group size, sharing 
rule, group impact function (i.e., a function specifying how individual efforts impact group 
performance), contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. There is a growing 
experimental literature testing these theoretical predictions (see the review by Sheremeta, 2018). 
Compared to contests between individuals, there is even more overbidding in group 
contests (Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011). Such overbidding is usually explained by the 
fact that (i) participants overbid when competing against other participants (Sheremeta, 2013, 
2015) and (ii) participants contribute to the group when cooperating with own group members 
(Ledyard et al, 1995). Another explanation takes its roots in parochial altruism (Bernhard et al., 
2006) and group identity (Cason et al., 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2016), suggesting that 
individuals simultaneously display altruism toward in-group members along with hostility 
toward out-group individuals. 
Despite overbidding, most studies on group contests find support for the comparative 
static predictions of the theory. For example, as predicted by the theory, experimental studies 
find that individual efforts are higher when members of the group are rewarded proportionally to 
their performance than when they are rewarded equally independent of their performance 
(Amaldoss et al., 2000; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006; Kugler et al., 2010; Majerczyk et 
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al., 2017). Also, consistent with the theory, behavior of individuals crucially depends on the 
group impact function, with the perfect-substitutes function generating the highest group effort 
(Abbink et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Ke et al., 2013, 2015), the weakest-link function 
generating the least free-riding (Cason et al., 2012, 2017; Brookins et al., 2018), and the best-
shot function generating the highest relative effort by strong players (Sheremeta, 2011). Another 
prediction supported by the data is that when players are heterogeneous, stronger players expend 
more effort and weaker players are more likely to free-ride; this is what Mancur Olson referred 
to as “exploitation of the great by the small”, and is observed in experiments by Sheremeta 
(2011), Brookins et al. (2015, 2018), Hargreaves Heap et al. (2015) and Bhattacharya (2016). 
The most notable comparative static prediction of the theory which is not supported by 
the data is the “group size paradox” (Olson, 1965). Almost all existing experimental studies 
examining the impact of group size on behavior in group contests find that larger groups are 
more likely to win than smaller groups, even when theory predicts otherwise (Rapoport and 
Bornstein, 1989; Abbink et al., 2010; Kugler et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011; Ke, 2013). So, while 
weak players may exploit strong players within their own large group by free-riding, it is not to 
the detriment of the group’s payoff in the broader contest, as Olson would have anticipated. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Over the past two decades researchers have used laboratory experiments to examine 
contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find 
that in contest experiments participants expend efforts which are significantly higher than 
predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static 
predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are 
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supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, 
including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-
dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. 
Given the space constraints, this review did not cover the issues of contest design, 
incomplete information, endogenous entry, risk, sabotage, alliances, demographic differences, 
etc. The reader interested in these and other issues examined by experimental research on 
contests should consult the surveys of Sheremeta (2013, 2015, 2016, and 2018), Chowdhury and 
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